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On Richard Swinburne and the Failings 





Earlier this year I was fortunate to be given the opportunity to present a 
paper at the University of Oxford, having been invited by the Oxford 
Symposium on Religious Studies. Although this is not one of the more 
prestigious Religious Studies conferences, the allure of presenting in the 
historic Old Library of the University Church of St Mary, the chance to 
receive helpful and non-helpful criticisms before submitting my thesis, and 
the support of my faculty made the decision to attend very easy.1 The 
papers were surprisingly of a very high quality, with the topics ranging 
from the always-contentious definition of religion, to the need for ‘liberal’ 
forms of traditional religions, to those Mormons who buck the trend 
regarding the commonly perceived inverse relationship between formal 
education and ‘religiosity’.2 We of the former European colonies did not 
fail to surprise and entertain, with one highlight coming from a spirited and 
elderly Latin American scholar disputing with the host, Canon Brian 
Mountford MBE, about the time she had left. The diverse attendees and 
presenters were generally very respectful and supportive of each other. 
Most were also very sociable, eager to indulge in the occasional celebratory 
snifter and/or to go on adventures around the University and its surrounds.3 
                                                
Raphael Lataster is a Teaching Fellow in the Department of Studies in Religion at the 
University of Sydney. 
1 I wish to acknowledge and thank the University of Sydney’s Faculty of Arts & Social 
Sciences for subsidising this trip via the Postgraduate Research Support Scheme. 
2 Regarding the relation between religion and education, see Phil Zuckerman, ‘Atheism, 
Secularity, and Well-Being: How the Findings of Social Science Counter Negative 
Stereotypes and Assumptions’, Sociology Compass, vol. 3, no. 6 (2009), pp. 949-971. 
3 For example, see Figure 1. My much more photogenic colleague presented an interesting 
and persuasive paper on the agency of Muslim women in sport. See Keelin Pringnitz, 
‘Athletic Hijabs Are Not a Form of Accomodation: An Application of “Deep Equality”’ 
(paper presented at the Oxford Symposium on Religious Studies, Oxford, 3rd August 2016). 
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I was surprised to find that even my own potentially controversial ideas 
were endorsed by the attendees, even those unashamedly Christian 




Figure 1 – Punting: the most Oxonian activity one can engage in. 
 
My paper was predictably on the improbability of theism and Christian 
theism. 4  This, like my almost completed doctoral dissertation (and 
associated articles),5 argues that the case for theism – and also Christian 
theism – presented by philosophers such as William Lane Craig and 
Richard Swinburne (b. 1934) is a failure. While my work focuses on 
Craig’s case, my sometime mentor and collaborator Herman Philipse of 
                                                
4 See Raphael Lataster, ‘The (Overwhelming) Improbability of Classical Theism’ (paper 
presented at the Oxford Symposium on Religious Studies, Oxford, 1st August 2016). 
5 Such as Raphael Lataster and Herman Philipse, ‘The Problem of Polytheisms: A Serious 
Challenge to Theism’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, DOI: 
10.1007/s11153-015-9554-x (2015) and Raphael Lataster, ‘Pantheistic God-Concepts: 
Ancient, Contemporary, Popular, and Plausible Alternatives to Classical Theism’, Literature 
& Aesthetics, vol. 25, no. 1 (2015), pp. 65-82. 
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Utrecht University has published, God in the Age of Science?, a thorough 
critique of Swinburne’s case for God’s existence and Jesus’ resurrection.6 
In the first part of my paper, several reasons were given for why the 
traditional arguments for theism are unpersuasive to many secular scholars 
(and also to many theistic scholars). 
For example, the cosmological argument from contingency 
generally assumes that the world is contingent, and that God is necessary. 
The Kalam Cosmological argument works on the unproven premise that the 
universe had an absolute beginning. Fine-tuning arguments are multiply 
problematic, with proponents seemingly unable to recognise that their 
preferred hypothesis (intelligent design) is at least as speculative as 
alternatives (such as necessity). Moral arguments tend to simply assume 
that an objective standard of morality exists, and that it could only have 
been God-given, while ontological arguments play on ambiguity, typically 
on what ‘possible’ means and what constitutes a ‘perfect’ or ‘maximally 
great’ being. Arguments from personal experience are subject to the 
problem of metaphysical excess. Why believe the highly improbable claims 
of one believer, while rejecting the highly improbable claims of many 
others? (I further argued for the improbability of miracles, undermined the 
case for Jesus’ resurrection, and also explained how mainstream critical 
scholarship is slowly coming to accept that questioning Jesus’ historical 
existence is at least somewhat reasonable.) 
Not only are such arguments unpersuasive to non-believers (and 
even to some believers), but granted that they do establish supernaturalism, 
they do not necessarily lead to classical theism. Arriving at ‘bare’ 
supernaturalism is usually not satisfying to religious believers. I argued that 
these could lead to various polytheisms and alternative monotheisms, and 
more plausibly lead to deisms, quasi-deisms, and pantheisms, which are – 
unlike theism – untouched by compelling arguments against God’s 
existence such as the argument from evil and the argument from divine 
hiddenness. My unorthodox approach in almost eschewing discussions 
about naturalism in my work contra theism is yet to be properly countered 
by theistic philosophers. Enter Richard Swinburne. 
The genteel British philosopher of religion lives minutes away 
from the University Church, and while a proposed debate was unfeasible 
                                                
6 Herman Philipse, God in the Age of Science?: A Critique of Religious Reason (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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due to the lack of a sizeable audience during England’s summer vacation 
period, he kindly agreed to an interview in his impressive home office 
about how he would approach critiques against his and similar arguments 
by the likes of Professor Philipse and myself. After exchanging 
pleasantries, and my presenting of Swinburne with the very Australian gift 
of a packet of Tim Tams, we began.7 What follows is the bulk of our 






Figure 2 – Still friends. Raphael (left), the Tim Tams (on the cabinet), and Richard (right). 
 
On being asked about the general lack of supernaturalistic alternatives 
considered in his probabilistic case for theism, Professor Swinburne 
answered:9 
                                                
7 Tim Tams are the Australian, and thus superior, version of the British Penguin biscuits. 
See Figure 2. 
8 Please note that some parts of the recording are unintelligible. These, and redundancies, 
are replaced by ellipses, and sometimes with paraphrases. Every effort has been made to 
preserve interpretative charity, however, and Swinburne has given his blessing to how I 
have portrayed his comments. 
9 One of the most relevant books concerning Swinburne’s case is Richard Swinburne, The 
Existence of God, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). In Chapter 14, he 
briefly mentions polytheism. 
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No scientific hypothesis when put forward considers all alternatives, and the 
argument for them is usually limited to two sorts of consideration. One is 
what other hypotheses are around and the other is, though it takes a lot of 
time to persuade scientists this is what they do, they ignore any of the 
infinite number of hypotheses which would yield this result on the grounds 
that they are too ad hoc, or as I would say, simple. Now, coming back to 
your alternatives, I would argue that all of them are in fact either less simple 
or have consequences which theism doesn’t, but in general my point is the 
first one. Well, it depends what my criterion for simplicity is. A simple 
hypothesis in my view, and of course I’ve… extrapolated these criteria from 
considering hypotheses that detectives put forward, that historians put 
forward, and of course that scientists put forward. 
A hypothesis is simple insofar as it postulates few entities, few kinds 
of entities, few properties, few kinds of properties, mathematically simple 
relations between them, and I can define mathematically simple. 
Mathematically simple relations between them include simple numbers, 
simple functions… Okay, so I think they all fail under those criteria. I just 
take one or two, you mentioned polytheism, well polytheism postulates 
many gods, theism postulates one… So you’d have to show, since that is 
pretty obvious, polytheism postulates many and theism postulates one, you 
would have to show that the gods postulated by polytheism were vastly 
simpler than that postulated by theism, and I think the reverse is the case. 
Why do I think that? Well, theism postulates not merely one god, but 
a god who is omnipotent, that’s just one property, and in the way I think 
now, it’s not quite the way I thought in some previous things, I think 
everything follows from, all the properties of god follow from the 
postulation of an essentially everlasting, omnipotent being. We could go 
through the steps here if you like, but you will find that in various things, 
including… [Points to the end of chapter 9 in the second edition of his 
Coherence of Theism].10 So, if that is right, polytheism can’t do better than 
that. Pantheism, well this is, postulating an infinite number of gods! 
Swinburne’s description of pantheism intrigued me, so I asked him if the 
monism of pantheism means that pantheism is simpler than the models – 
like theism – that require (the completely evidentially unjustified) 
substance dualism. 
Well, its postulating vast numbers of entities, as any physical hypothesis, the 
universe consists of vast number of entities because you can cut it up in 
different ways, and its got this planet and that planet and the other planet, 
now, your pantheism is the extreme form of that. Not merely am I a 
conscious being, but my finger is a conscious being, and the atoms that make 
up my finger is a conscious being. And there are all these conscious beings 
around, which if I understand the pantheists correctly, their consciousness as 
                                                
10 Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016). 
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it were is a brute fact, it’s not dependent on any other entity which keeps 
them conscious, that’s the ultimate. Therefore, this is vastly complicated. It’s 
rather similar… to the hypothesis that, well, the universe is self-explaining. 
Or rather, doesn’t need any further explanation. So what you’ve got there is, 
the ultimate is, all these chunks of matter and energy, and their properties, 
and there are infinite or possibly very large finite number of such chunks, 
though inevitably, they all behave in the same way, so inevitably it’s going 
to be more complicated than theism. 
While there may be forms of pantheism that cohere with Swinburne’s 
description, many more typical models do not.11 Pantheism is often seen as 
entailing a single, universal, consciousness, so that Swinburne’s description 
seems uncharacteristic. We would ideally have discussed this in more 
detail. Nevertheless, this lack of awareness about the variety of 
supernaturalistic alternatives and the mischaracterisation of them is quite 
prominent in the Philosophy of Religion.12 
Returning to the most pressing issue, Swinburne dismisses the 
supernaturalistic alternatives to theism due to considerations about specific 
notions of simplicity. However, as argued in much of my work, the theist 
needs to demonstrate that that this sort of simplicity does indeed affect the 
respective probabilities, beyond its being pragmatically preferable. 
Furthermore, it is often overlooked that many of these alternatives are 
actually simpler than theism by the theist’s own reckoning. I explained that 
it is also very important to describe the differences in simplicity, and the 
probability distribution, since the sheer number of alternatives could in 
principle overwhelm theism’s potentially slight increase in probability (to 
say nothing of other factors and evidences that affect the calculation).13 
After denying that latter suggestion, Swinburne expounded: 
Well, why is simplicity evidence of truth? The answer is, this is just a 
fundamental epistemic principle, which can’t be derived from anything else 
more fundamental. You can see it at work in everything that scientists, 
                                                
11 Swinburne seems to have a distributive view rather than a collective view of pantheism. 
12 For example, Göcke conceived of a slightly altered for of classical theism, labelled it 
‘panentheism’, and then effectively assumed that it was less desirable than classical theism. 
I explained that his work was logically fallacious and irrelevant, since it did not accurately 
portray what Indian mystics, Western panentheistic philosophers, and indeed the etymology 
of the term, describe. See Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Panentheism and Classical Theism’, 
Sophia, vol. 52, no. 1 (2013), pp. 61-75; and Raphael Lataster, ‘The Attractiveness of 
Panentheism—a Reply to Benedikt Paul Göcke’, Sophia, vol. 53, no. 3 (2014), pp. 389-395. 
There were further replies, which added little, if anything, to the discussion. 
13 This is properly argued in Lataster and Philipse, ‘The Problem of Polytheisms’. 
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historians, detectives do, and if you didn’t think that then you would have no 
reason for supposing that if you walk out the window you’ll fall down rather 
than float upwards. 
I interjected that people prefer simpler theories. 
Well, yeah, but why do they prefer it? They prefer it because it’s probably 
true. At least they think so. And you can see that by, well, these days it’s 
easy enough as it were to produce a rather more complicated hypothesis, 
which is compatible with the data. I’m sure a computer program could do 
that pretty easily. So it can’t just be a matter of convenience that they do 
that. And if they did think it was merely a matter of convenience, then they 
would, then you must bear in mind that as it were for any finite collection of 
data there will be some hypothesis, which makes any prediction you like 
about the future. And therefore, they would think there’s nothing wrong in 
supposing that when you walk out the window you will fly in the air. But 
there is something wrong with this, and what I’m trying to do is distil the 
principle, which has that consequence. It is an a priori principle, its not an a 
posteriori principle, it’s an a priori principle which is crucial for all science. 
Scientists don’t like being told they have a priori principles, “we are an 
empirical discipline”, etc., etc. It’s just not true. You can get them to see that 
usually after about an hour’s bullying. 
Unconvinced that this response justifies the theist’s belief that simplicity 
and probability are correlated, and that this also justifies the complete 
disregard for alternatives to theism, I raise the issue of substance dualism. 
Scientists are yet to discover that minds can exist independent of a body, or 
something physical, which is partly why I find monistic models to be 
preferable. I asked Swinburne about this, and if he specifically had any 
comments about Philipse’s declaration that the former’s notion of an 
unembodied mind is ‘incoherent’.14 
Indeed. What sort of ‘can’ is it that can exist? [Swinburne refers to whether 
people ‘can’ exist without the body.] I go along with Descartes… Well, the 
issue is, what makes me, me? What future state of affairs would consist in 
me being me. And the ‘can’ in question is therefore logical possibility. That 
is to say, or at stage one, is it logically possible that I survive without my 
body? Is there any contradiction in this? [We agreed that there is no logical 
contradiction.] Okay, is there any contradiction in supposing that I survive 
without any capacity for thought or feeling or anything like that? [We again 
agreed that there is no logical contradiction.] Well, suppose I die and I’m on 
the slab and everybody says, “Well his blood is circulating and so on, but 
he’s obviously lost the capacity for thought and feeling and so on, shall we 
turn the machine off?” And assuming that people think this is not just a 
temporary loss but a permanent loss, the obvious answer is, “Yes he doesn’t 
                                                
14 For example, see Philipse, God in the Age of Science?, pp. 109-113. 
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exist anymore.” So I think that it’s not logically impossible when you start 
reflecting on that, our very conception of ourselves is as a being capable of 
thought… 
Okay, so reflection gives us the conception that for our existence, if 
we are to exist, then we must be able to go on thinking, and there’s no 
contradiction in supposing that that could happen if we don’t have a body. 
Okay, now is it logically possible that while I am thinking my body ceases to 
function and I cease to have any control over it, but I go on thinking? This is 
a slightly different question from the one I asked before. Before I asked is it 
possible there could be such a being. Now I’m asking, for yourself, is it 
logically possible, that you could as it were go on thinking… [I stated that I 
would likely concede that all of his scenarios are logically possible.] Alright, 
but in that case, is it logically possible that anything can exist if you 
suddenly destroy all its parts? Could this desk continue to exist if I destroy 
the top and the desk drawers and everything else? [We eventually agreed 
that, if all of it destroyed, it would cease to exist.] 
Okay, now, you have admitted that I could go on existing even if I 
don’t have a body, you’ve admitted that I could go on existing if I’m 
thinking and I suddenly lose my body, I could still go on existing, but I 
couldn’t go on existing if every part of me ceased to exist, so I must 
currently have another part. A non-bodily part… soul… So that shows that 
our present conception of ourselves, this is Descartes, and Descartes tidied 
up a bit I admit but Descartes all the same, our conception of ourselves is a 
conception of us having two parts, body and soul. Now that’s why I asked to 
start with, “What sort of ‘can’ is this about?”… Of course that doesn’t prove 
that this is naturally possible in some stronger sense, but our very 
conception of ourselves is as soul plus body. Now, let’s see if we can do a 
bit better than that. 
Thought experiments for, you maybe met some of these. In the 
future, some mad scientist may get hold of me, and he may remove my brain 
from there, and he may cut it into two, and he might put one half in one 
clone of me and the other half in another clone of me, and connect up all the 
nerves, and then we would have two clones of me, each of whom, since 
they’ve got half my brain, might well claim to be me. But they couldn’t both 
be me, because if something’s me then it would feel what I feel, and if I 
stick a needle into that one, this one won’t feel anything… So they’re not the 
same person as each other. But they make all the same claims to be each 
other. And this is not mere thought experiment. This sort of thing is within 
the bounds… [I interject, asking, “What happens to you, do you cease to 
exist?”] There are just three possibilities in this situation, either this one’s 
me and that one isn’t, or that one is and that one isn’t, or I don’t exist. The 
whole thing might just be traumatic. Okay, well, my point is we don’t know 
which is the answer and no conceivable scientific discovery could show 
which is the answer. 
And what that shows is that being me doesn’t consist in having some 
particular part of me, because it’s compatible with being me that one only 
has that half and it’s compatible with being me that one that half, yet there 
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must be a truth and the truth would not be known even if you knew what had 
happened to every part of my body. [I ask, “Right, so we don’t know either 
way?] No. … You can prove the thought experiment a bit by showing that 
no part of me is necessary, because suppose I have a brain disease, cancer on 
the brain, so a part of my brain has to be removed but it’s replaced by a bit 
from my [unintelligible] and suppose this happens ten times, and then we’ve 
got something that consists of none of it but might well be me in virtue of 
the continuity that is being preserved. … What I’m pointing out is that it’s 
logically possible, but rather stronger than that… We exist as long as our 
souls exist and it’s not necessary for our souls to exist that we should have 
any particular part. Now we can conceive, and you admitted earlier, of a 
being without a body, and that remark of Philipse I suspect was from, “We 
can’t talk of God because our very notion of a person is a notion of an 
embodied person.” And I suggest that isn’t so for the reasons I’ve given you. 
Again, in accordance with what is typically encountered in the field, 
Swinburne has defended only the possibility of his crucial premise, not its 
probability. 15  It is worth noting that many of Swinburne’s ideas are 
contradicted by the available evidence. For example, cases like that of 
Phineas Gage reveal that manipulations of the brain alter the ‘mind’ and/or 
‘person’.16 Proceeding, and again referring to a crucial (to some) but 
evidentially unjustified theistic doctrine, I asked for Swinburne’s thoughts 
on creatio ex nihilo. He said, “If creatio ex nihilo is a temporal claim, that 
is to say once upon a time there was nothing and then God brings the 
universe into being, well it might be true, it might be false, it doesn’t really 
matter from my point of view”, and he went on to indicate that he is more 
interested in God as a sustaining cause.17 
Another major criticism from Philipse about Swinburne’s case is that 
if/since God’s intentions are inscrutable, a probabilistic case for God is 
impossible, presumably because the hypothesis is incomplete and lacks all 
explanatory power.18 There does seem to be an air of unfalsifiability also, 
                                                
15 Philipse presents a many-layered argument against Swinburne’s notion, some of which is 
in Philipse, God in the Age of Science?, pp. 97-103. I take it that Philipse is not saying that 
the notion of an unembodied mind is logically impossible; he only means that it is 
something without precedent. In other words, as I often claim, while the option cannot be 
ruled out, it must be assigned a very low prior probability. 
16 See Hanna Damasio et al., ‘The Return of Phineas Gage: Clues About the Brain from The 
Skull of a Famous Patient’, Science, vol. 264, no. 5162 (1994), pp. 1102-1105. 
17 We could consider whether this would be ‘simple’. 
18 Philipse’s criticism is more complex, since he also refutes Swinburne’s moral access 
claim, which is what helps Swinburne determine God’s intentions. See Chapter 9 of 
Philipse, God in the Age of Science? 
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since any state of the evidence can support theism, based on the theist 
appealing to any possibility about God’s intentions and/or appealing to 
ignorance/mysteriousness (as we see with many theodicies). Swinburne 
responds, “I don’t think God’s intentions are inscrutable.” He continues: 
I get from omnipotence to perfect goodness. So if something is manifestly 
bad then that counts against, all I need to, one doesn’t have to need 
conclusive falsifiability or whatever, but so long as some sorts of things are 
to be expected if there’s a god, are probable if there’s a god, and so forth, 
things aren’t probable, and certain sort of things that aren’t probable count 
against. So it becomes me to show that the universe is basically a good 
thing, and I have argued that. 
While here not properly addressing our charge, Swinburne also seems to 
have offered up a lite version of a theodicy. The fact that theistic 
philosophers have grappled for centuries with the problem of evil or 
gratuitous suffering arguably ought to lead to the conclusion that either 
there is no god, or it is a very different god (that is, not the God of theism) 
that exists. Forging ahead, Christian philosophers of the analytic tradition 
believe that the current state of the evidence supports theism and Christian 
theism. There is a risk that, if the state of the evidence changes, the 
Christian philosopher will find that the evidence now disconfirms her 
views. I asked Swinburne that if this were to occur, if he would de-convert, 
or remain a Christian due to faith or cultural reasons, and if he would stop 
arguing that theism/Christianity were probably true. His response: 
Well I think we’ve really got all, the most general sorts of evidence 
are most unlikely to change, so the sort of evidence I rely on, you people 
could deny there is a universe, it’s governed by, etc., so I don’t see that very 
likely to happen. But the only controversy is what that supports. … The 
controversy between theism and atheism and what is good evidence for. The 
idea of some big new piece of evidence turning up seems to me a bit 
implausible. But if it were to turn up, and if it were to have very strong force 
against theism, then I hope I would take account of it. Coming down to what 
‘take account of it’ means, it depends on one’s understanding of faith and 
one of your questions was of that nature. 
On my account of faith, to have faith in God is to act on the 
assumption that he’s there and will look after me and so on. Now that’s a 
reasonable thing to act on an assumption even if the assumption isn’t 
probably true. It depends on what the assumption is and… [I interject that 
my field is Religious Studies, so need no convincing of the validity of 
religious practice apart from evidentiary concerns.] I think you do need 
evidence, but what I say is, it is sometimes sensible to rely on an assumption 
even if the assumption isn’t on balance probable. What I don’t think is 
sensible to do is to rely on an assumption which is almost certainly false. 
That would just be silly. But innumerable examples, mundane examples, 
will suggest that it’s sometimes sensible to rely on an assumption that isn’t 
Swinburne and Theistic Evidentialism 
Literature & Aesthetics 26 2016 33 
probably true, if it’s only by relying on that assumption that you can get 
something that you badly want. Trivial, if the only thing you want in life is a 
million dollars, and you’ve only got one dollar, and the only way you can 
get a million dollars is by buying a lottery ticket, then you should buy a 
lottery ticket. 
But in the case of God, well God isn’t the only good thing in the 
world, there are many lesser goods, and we should take that into account, but 
so I think we do require a reasonable amount of evidence but that doesn’t 
mean to say that we need it to be more probable than not. If we want the 
goal of religion, which is to live the best life on this earth, and after this 
earth, that is possible. If we think that the best way to most probably get that 
is the Christian religion, if we also thought that the same goal was offered by 
Islam, then whether we follow Christianity or Islam must depend on the 
balance of probabilities as to which is more probable than the other one. [I 
ask if he thinks that Christianity is more probably true than Islam.] Yes. 
While appreciative that he would be willing to change his mind given new 
and contradictory evidence, I wonder about the consistency of an approach 
that appeals to pragmatic concerns (I – and others – have earlier agued that 
various pantheisms trump the exclusivist theism with its inherent ‘othering’ 
on this point),19 and that also builds on premises that are probabilistically 
problematic (such as the notion of the afterlife). Nevertheless, I proceeded 
to ask about the theists’ presumptions concerning God’s eternality, 
maximal greatness, uncaused nature, and so forth. Could these not also 
apply to the universe or multiverse? 
Well of course I think the argument for God is, in my view, the argument for 
the simplest explanation of the universe, etc., etc. And I think the simplest 
explanation is in terms of an essentially everlasting, omnipotent being. 
Followed from that, that he’s by definition everlasting, it also follows in my 
view that the other typical theistic properties also follow. And of course 
there’s nothing strange about this. Scientists postulate a theory as the 
simplest theory of their data; other things follow from their hypothesis, for 
which they have no other evidence than their present data. A multiverse is a 
good example of that. Your only grounds for believing in a multiverse is that 
a certain theory provides the best explanation of things that we can observe, 
that theory has consequences that there will be other universes. 
Unfortunately, there is seemingly little that theistic and non-theistic 
philosophers can agree on regarding what constitutes simpler – or rather, 
more inherently probable – theories and what explanations are preferable. 
                                                
19 Historian Arnold Toynbee asserted that if humankind did not switch from monotheistic 
faiths towards pantheistic ones, the human race, and possibly the planet, would likely be 
doomed. See Arnold Toynbee, ‘The Religious Background of the Present Environmental 
Crisis’, International Journal of Environmental Studies, vol. 3, no. 1-4 (1972), pp. 141-146. 
Swinburne and Theistic Evidentialism 
Literature & Aesthetics 26 2016 34 
Keen to move on, I asked Swinburne for his opinion about the weak points 
in the case for theism and Christianity, and the best evidences against. 
Regards theism, of course the apparent strongest objection is the problem of 
evil, inevitably. I mean I think I have a theodicy that will deal with that but it 
needs to be shown, not everyone’s convinced by it. But inevitably, that is 
gonna be the case. I think there is a satisfactory theodicy to deal with that 
because I think the evils or allowing the evils of the world is a necessary 
condition of certain greater goods that wouldn’t exist without it. But that 
needs to be argued. Christian theism though, and some of your questions 
were concerned with that, is a much more fuller doctrine. Christian theism 
has various extra bits than theism, considerable number of extra bits. It 
depends on what you think is essential to Christian theism. 
But if you take the Nicene Creed, then yes, clearly if you found one 
fault there then that would mean that traditional Christian theism was very 
improbable. … It starts from, “probably there’s a God”, now I reflect on 
what the claim “there is a God” would mean given a world of sin and 
suffering. We’re aware people do what is wrong and suffer; how would a 
god react to this? Well, I think that if he allows suffering or evil to occur for 
a good cause, nevertheless there comes a time where he has an obligation to 
share it, and that means become incarnate. There are more human examples 
of that which I’ve used. Here’s one: suppose there’s a war, there’s 
conscription, the government forces people between the age of eighteen and 
thirty to fight in the army. It’s a just war but the government is prepared to 
give exemption to people, if their parents make a special case. Suppose I 
have a son, he’s called up, or the government attempted to call it up, he 
asked me to make a special case, I refuse, because this is a just war. Suppose 
also that people over the age of thirty are allowed to volunteer to fight in the 
army… If I have no other reason and I force him to fight, I ought to fight, 
too. 
Well, by analogy, God, who sees human suffering, has an obligation 
to share it. So we would expect an incarnation for that reason. We would 
also expect an incarnation because humans have to offer an atonement… 
[Refers to his Was Jesus God.]20 But he needs to provide an atonement for 
humans then. And so he also needs to reveal certain truths to people, which 
they haven’t been able to find out for themselves. So I a priori, before ever 
we come to historical evidence, I think there is reason to suppose that God 
will become incarnate. But my argument suggests he’d become incarnate in 
a certain way. He would become incarnate, living a life of suffering or 
containing a significant amount of suffering… He would also need, of 
course, to claim to be God, because otherwise we wouldn’t benefit by this. 
He would need to claim that his life was an atonement for sin. … He would 
need to reveal certain truths. So you have a priori, in advance, reason to 
expect that a prophet will turn up who satisfies these demands. 
                                                
20 Richard Swinburne, Was Jesus God? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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If you look around all the major religions, none of their founders 
satisfy all these demands. Muhammad doesn’t claim to be god, the Buddha 
doesn’t, etc., etc. [I asked if Jesus had to arrive via the Jewish tradition.] I 
don’t see it’s necessary that it would be in the Jewish tradition but I don’t 
think any civilisation outside that could have understood some of these 
concepts. Firstly, no other civilisation was monotheistic. I know people 
claim Akhenaton but Akhenaton was a one off, his people didn’t follow him 
in that respect. The Jewish is the only one. [We briefly discussed 
Zoroastrianism’s questionable monotheism.] There’s no evil god in Judaism. 
And of course Judaism has the deep concepts of sin and atonement and so 
on, ready to use as a natural vehicle for this. 
Alright, well then we must look around at the historical evidence and 
see if there is a prophet who satisfies these, and of course there is one. Not 
merely that, but if that prophet is to show people that he’s God, it’s clearly 
desirable that he should as it were produce God’s signature, as I call it, on 
his work. A signature is an act that only one person can do. And 
Deuteronomy implies that if a prophet comes, to be a genuine prophet he 
must of course teach that there’s only one god and so on and so forth. But if 
what he prophesies doesn’t come to pass, then he’s not a true prophet, 
implying that if what he prophesies does come to pass, then that shows he is. 
Well one thing Jesus quite obviously taught was the doctrine of the 
resurrection of the dead. And Christianity claims of course that he actually 
produced the first example of this, by himself rising from the dead. So in 
light of that of course we’ve got to look at the evidence for the resurrection, 
and I think it’s quite good. Certainly not good enough without an a priori 
backing that we’re expecting that. But with an a priori backing expecting 
that, I think it’s quite good. I guess that’s why I support that. 
As is usual in the discipline, the evidential argument from evil is 
considered to be the strongest argument against theism.21 Swinburne’s 
answer presupposed much, and the notion about God’s obligation seems to 
infringe upon God’s (and perhaps our) free will. As for the arguments 
concerning God’s incarnation, I surmise that this is retrospective; 
Swinburne thinks that the god of theism would eventually become 
incarnate, through a figure very much like Jesus, just because he already 
believes that God did become incarnate through Jesus. I also wonder, if 
Swinburne is correct about the theistic god being likely to become 
incarnate, about earlier philosophers figuring this out and – perhaps even 
with the best of intentions – becoming ‘false prophets’. Jesus may have 
been one such figure, and perhaps the god of theism did not reveal herself 
                                                
21 Particularly influential has been Rowe’s formulation, famously advanced in William 
Rowe, ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’, American Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 4 (1979), pp. 335-341. 
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through the Jewish tradition after all. Particularly telling is Swinburne’s 
latter comment, which essentially served as an admission that the (crucial) 
historical evidence concerning supernatural claims made about Jesus is ‘not 
good enough’ to stand on its own. This further exposes the (likely) logical 
flaw in supposing that God would become incarnate because there is 
historical evidence that suggested that this happened. We continued to talk 
about the role of evidence, when faith is usually so important to religious 
adherence. 
If the evidence makes it probable then of course I have an obligation to 
worship, because if the evidence is probable then all my existence and 
everything in it, all the good things in life, are due to God, and I owe him 
grateful worship; and if he asks me to do things to do them, within limits.22 I 
have an obligation, if the evidence is a bit weaker than that, but nevertheless 
of some significance, then it becomes rational to live by this because there’s 
a good thing, which I can only achieve in that way. But if there were no 
evidence at all, or the evidence shows that there isn’t such a being, then it’s 
very silly to live in that way because I will not get any benefit from it. 
Finding contradiction with his various comments about the pragmatic 
benefits of religious beliefs, I could not resist the temptation to again ask 
about pantheism. “So I wonder if the evidence makes theism less probable, 
and an alternative like pantheism is more probable, would it not be rational 
to then disavow theism and become a pantheist?” Swinburne countered, 
“Well, only if pantheism offered equal good state.” After I explained that 
many historical intellectuals have found pantheism to be more inclusive 
than monotheism and classical theism, to which Swinburne admitted, “If 
that were to be the case, that that does serve some good, and if it were to be 
the case, which for reasons I’ve given it certainly isn’t, then your 
consequence would follow.” He then suggested that, in light of the 
difficulty in differentiating between consciousness and non-consciousness, 
pantheists believe – with no good reason – that everything is conscious 
(hinting also that they are all separate entities – which seems to oppose the 
monism of pantheism), which, given the diversity of pantheistic models, I 
could not agree with. With our interview coming to a close, I took the 
opportunity to ask Swinburne if he had any comments about where 
                                                
22 Note that different people will have different limits. Dena Schlosser mutilated her child, 
after supposedly hearing “voices commanding her to remove the arms of her 11-month-old 
daughter as a sacrifice” to her god. See Theresa Porter and Helen Gavin, ‘Infanticide and 
Neonaticide: A Review of 40 Years of Research Literature on Incidence and Causes’, 
Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, vol. 11, no. 3 (2010), pp. 101. 
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Philipse’s critique in God in the Age of Science succeeds and fails. His 
answer: 
Oh dear, I haven’t read the book from cover to cover. I read drafts of a 
number of chapters for him when he was writing it, and I gave him my 
comments then. I’m afraid I haven’t taken account. I’ve read a bit of it, but I 
haven’t read all of it, so I don’t know. The only bit I’ve critiqued in detail is 
his argument that we can’t understand the notion of a deity who hasn’t had a 
body because all our understanding of a person is derived from observing 
ordinary human persons. [Swinburne again refers to the second edition of his 
Coherence of Theism (which he claims to have been working on for the last 
three years), where he addresses this point.] 
While academics are typically very busy, it is disappointing that Swinburne 
did not read the entirety of Philipse’s critique, during those three years. 
Based on this and my interactions with other theistic philosophers of 
religion, it does seem that, while secular philosophers such as Philipse and 
myself are interested in engaging with the best and most promising 
arguments for supernaturalism, Christian philosophers are not so interested 
in tackling the best arguments made by non-believers. Philipse wrote an 
impressive book on Swinburne’s case, published with a very reputable 
academic press, which the latter has not fully read. Likewise, my 
dissertation and related articles deal mostly with the case presented by 
William Lane Craig, who routinely refuses my well-meaning offers for 
debates or other public discussions on God’s existence, though he 
continues to debate secularists less versed in the Philosophy of Religion. 
Still eager to discuss Swinburne’s interactions (or lack thereof) with 
Philipse’s work, I asked about their 2012 debate in Amsterdam.23 Here 
Swinburne commendably acknowledged that the truth of theism would first 
need to be established, before Christian claims, such as those made about 
Jesus’ resurrection, could be accepted. He also stated that the theistic 
hypothesis is incomplete and needs filling out, presumably with Christian 
theology. Brushing aside concerns about circularity, Swinburne now 
clarifies, “Well it’s incomplete from the point of view of Christianity; that 
is all. There’s more to Christianity than that. Theism by itself doesn’t as it 
were provide much of a guide for life.” Agreeing wholeheartedly, we then 
revisited Swinburne’s assumption that Jesus was not one of the many false 
– and Jewish – prophets. Reminding me about his earlier mentioned a priori 
                                                
23  The Veritas Forum. ‘Is There A God?’, at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRgHQCmbR7U. accessed 09/09/2016. 
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reasons for thinking that God would become incarnate, Swinburne 
continued: 
One could also expect, among other things, to teach us how to live, as well 
as himself living a certain sort of life, and of course if he taught us to do 
things that were obviously wrong, that would count against him being… But 
in my view, and in the view of many atheists, his general teaching about 
how one ought to live is the sort of teaching that a perfectly good god would 
give. 
Much of his latter claim being particularly doubtful, it seems plausible that 
Jesus did indeed teach things that were, from a Jewish perspective, 
‘wrong’. Jesus’ contradictions with various books of the Tanakh and his 
conflicts with mainstream Jews of his time are well known.24 With our 
conversation winding down, I asked about Swinburne’s decision to study 
philosophy, and about his move from Anglicanism to Orthodoxy. He said, 
“Well what attracted me to philosophy is I’m interested in big questions!” 
and that, “being religious”, while “most philosophers aren’t religious 
believers”, some of their tools could be used for what he “regarded as the 
right purposes. And those two things certainly pushed me into philosophy.” 
As for his move to Orthodoxy, Swinburne laments that the “Church of 
England has changed a lot”, become too liberal, that they have “reached an 
‘anything goes’ stage.” He thinks that the Church had “lost the sense” that 
it is the “vehicle of revelation”, adding:  
The doctrine of the incarnation, a significant number of the clergy in recent 
years, 10% or something, interpret this as saying, “a man became 
particularly open to God”, whereas the doctrine is that God became man, not 
man became God. That is so fundamental that I felt that… 
Here I interjected, to ask why he chose Orthodoxy instead of, say, 
Catholicism. Swinburne intimated that he sought an apostolic church, 
thinking that these “are the only two remaining alternatives”,25 and that he 
does not “think the Pope is infallible”. Finally, I, offering him the 
opportunity to speak off the record, queried Swinburne on his views 
                                                
24 For example, see the chapter entitled ‘The Anti-Biblical Jesus’, in Hector Avalos, The 
Bad Jesus: The Ethics of New Testament Ethics (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 
2015). Also helpful, though more confessional, is Steve Moyise, Jesus and Scripture: 
Studying the New Testament Use of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 
2010). Even many Gospel pericopes portray Jesus’ conflict with mainstream Jews of his 
day, such as Matthew 23 and John 8. 
25 The Church of the East may have something to say about that. For more on this ancient 
Christian organisation, see Wilhelm Baum and Dietmar W. Winkler, The Church of the 
East: A Concise History (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
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regarding Brexit, and Oxford’s challenges regarding female genital 





Figure 3 – The home of the world’s oldest Anglophone 
university has a rampant FGM problem. 
 
It’s alleged, and probably rightly, that a great deal of this goes on among the 
immigrant communities from Somalia in particular and so on, and it’s also 
alleged that because everybody for the past ten years, twenty years, has been 
so sensitive about criticising immigrants… that all the doctors and the police 
have ignored this and so on. [I quickly asked about why Islam largely seems 
immune to criticism, compared with Christianity.] Well, that is what has 
happened [laughs]. 
On the unexected Brexit result, Swinburne unashamedly declared, “I voted 
leave”.27 Without a hint of racism or Islamophobia, and without also 
                                                
26 On the coach ride from London to Oxford, I was shocked to see posters warning against 
FGM, plastered all over Oxfordshire. See Figure 3. For more information on this serious 
issue, see Oxford Against Cutting. ‘The Facts’, at http://oxfordagainstcutting.org/facts. 
Accessed 09/09/2016. 
27 Regarding Brexit and then Trump’s recent successful bid for the presidency of the USA, it 
is purported that the unexpected results (at least if polls were consulted), were caused by 
silent majorities unwilling to publicly share their less than politically correct views. For 
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touching on economic concerns, he explained that he thinks that democracy 
works better “in smaller units”. Unimpressed by the prospect of European 
parliamentary candidates of whom the British know nothing about, 
Swinburne asserts that, “people would feel very alienated, as they do at the 
moment”. He also mentioned the great hostility towards European 
directives, such as what can be called ‘chocolate’. To Swinburne, 
democracy “works okay at Athens” and in communities with the same 
language and similar backgrounds, but “get beyond that and people feel 
alienated, that’s why I voted that way”. 
 
Conclusion 
Swinburne seemed unwilling or unable to properly address one of my 
biggest challenges to his – and others philosophers’ – defence of theism; 
that supernaturalistic alternatives to theism are more – or at least just as – 
probable. His assertions about simplicity assumed too much, often 
involving misunderstandings about the alternative hypotheses, and, without 
transparent calculations, are ultimately irrelevant. Until it is decisively 
demonstrated that (what theists consider to be) the simpler theories are 
more probable, and are sufficiently more probable than the alternatives, 
considerations of the former do not truly aid the analysis. Similarly, 
Swinburne’s attempt to defend the notion of the unembodied mind justified 
only its logical possibility, not its probability. 
While Swinburne’s responses to some of my other questions were 
interesting, such as his idea that theism entails a Gospel-like scenario, it 
was unfortunate that none persuaded me to think better of the case for 
theism and for Christian theism. It was also disheartening to discover that 
he had not yet properly engaged and addressed Philipse’s comprehensive 
critique of his life’s work. Nevertheless, I can only be thankful that 
Swinburne invited me into his sanctuary, and was so generous with his 
time. Interestingly, we were seemingly able to find some common ground 
regarding the dangers of naïve approaches to multiculturalism and 
immigration. 
 
                                                                                                             
more on this type of phenomenon, with a focus on the specific form known as the ‘Bradley 
effect’, see J. Gregory Payne, ‘The Bradley Effect: Mediated Reality of Race and Politics in 
the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election’, American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 54, no. 4 (2010), 
pp. 417-435. 
